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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Cold War has ended. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFT A), World
Trade Organization (WTO), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and
the European Union have changed the global political and economic landscape in only a
few short years. This review draws together responses from national and California
public opinion surveys over the past ten years to paint a broad picture of the public's
views on foreign trade.
Neither trade isolationism nor international activism have become dominant directions in
American public opinion. 'vVhat has emerged is adoption by the public of a position best
characterized by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations as "pragmatic
internationalism." 1 "Pragmatic internationalism" means that Americans are generally
committed to an active trade and foreign relations role for the U.S. in the world. 2 Despite
polling limitations, the accumulated findings over a ten-year period support the view that
the public is generally aware of both the positive and negative impacts of foreign trade on
their home life. 3 The public has also become more concerned about economic
vulnerability, which, in tum, affects opinions about broader international issues (U.S.
policy toward Japan and China, for example).
The various limitations of public opinion polls and the fluid nature of public opinion,
make it difficult to precisely describe the public's views on foreign trade policy. Only
national or state polls conducted by established and well-known pollsters are cited in this
review. Nonetheless, different polls, even completed at the same time, may record
significant differences in opinion about specific issues depending on how the question is
worded, the size of the sample, the surveyed geographic region, and other factors. A poll
may cause the respondent to develop an opinion in response to poll questions, an opinion
that they may not have held prior to being asked. In nearly all cases, the pollster did not
ask the same question from year to year, nor did different pollsters use the same
questions. Coverage of significant foreign trade issues is quite spotty and varies over the
ten-year period covered in this review. In some cases, different polls have been pulled
together in a single graph in an attempt to show historical trends.
In general, public opinion polls suggest that Americans tend to view economic rather than
military power as the most significant measure of global strength. But the public and its
leaders disagree on the level of support they give this viewpoint. In 1998, 63 percent of
the public and 89 percent of the nation's leaders* agreed that economic power is the most
significant measure of global strength, a 26 percentage point difference. 4

• Unless noted otherwise, this term follows the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations (CCFR) usage which
defines "leaders" as: "Americans in senior positions with knowledge of international affairs. Roughly,
equal proportions were included from the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the administration.
Leaders were also drawn from the business community, the media, academia and private foreign policy
institutes. A smaller number of leaders was drawn from national labor unions, churches and special interest
groups relevant to foreign policy." John E. Rielly, American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999
(Chicago: the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1999) at http://www.ccfr.org.

California Research Bureau, California State Library

1

A similar and long-standing difference has existed between the U.S. public and U.S.
leaders across several foreign trade and policy dimensions (Table 1). Concerns about

Table 1
Differences in opinion between U.S. public and leaders agreeing with the
following statements (excluding "no opinion") (1998)

Economic competition from low-wage countries is a critical threat.
Protecting the jobs of American workers is a very important goal.
'r.

·cc,

.,_

The U.S. does not have a vital interest in Brazil.
The U.S. does not have a vital interest in Mexico.
The U.S. should not contribute to the IMF to meet world financial crisis.
Economic competition from Japan is a critical threat.

Public
69%
83%

Leaders
31%
45%

rro.n

Gap
38%
38%
'"' on

VV 'U

.JV 'U

58%
29%
67%
47%

24%
6%
16%
14%

34%
23%
51%
32%

Source: John E. Rielly, American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999 (Chicago: the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations,
1999), p. 38. (Available at httn:/iwv.w.ccfi·.ont.)

international economic competition and job loss are of greater concern to the general
public than to the leaders, as the first three questions in Table 1 indicate. Other polls
have found that the public is more likely to say that the U.S. has a vital interest in a
foreign nation when an economic and political crisis occurs there. 5 As Table 1 shows,
the general public is also much more inclined than leaders to agree that the U.S. does not
have a vital interest in Brazil. In the case of Mexico, a large majority of the public and
leaders agree the U.S. has a vital interest in Mexico, but the magnitude of agreement
varies. The general public is also less positively inclined than leaders toward the U.S.
contributing to the International Monetary Fund. A little less than half of the public,
compared to only 14 percent ofleaders, sees economic competition with Japan as a
threat.
The differences between opinions of the U.S public and leaders may reflect the leaders'
more detailed knowledge of economic policy, and perhaps their relatively more secure
economic position. In some cases, leaders may have failed to educate and persuade the
public to their view. There also may be substantial differences in the ways in which
economic foreign policy outcomes affect the two groups, leading to differences in
perceived personal risk or benefit. Blue-collar workers, for example, have a direct stake
in the movement of manufacturing jobs overseas.
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PUBLIC INTEREST IN FOREIGN TRADE NEWS
In 1999, 39 percent of Americans felt that they were very knowledgeable or
knowledgeable about foreign trade, compared to 44 percent reporting little or no
knowledge. 6 Nonetheless, public interest in national news, U.S. foreign relations, and
news about other countries declined from 1994 through 1998. Interest in news about
foreign countries, defined as "very interested," declined from a high of 36 percent in
1990 to 33 percent in 1994, to 29 percent in 1998. 7 Even so, this interest in foreign
countries was higher than the period between 1974 and 1986. 8 Outright lack of interest in
foreign news has diminished somewhat over the long run. Individuals with higher levels
of education or international travel experience are more apt to follow news of fOreigu.
countries (as much as 7 percentage points higher). 9

Chart 1
Percent of Public Very Interested in Foreign
Relations News (1990-1998)
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Source: John E. Rielly, American Public Opinion and US. Foreign Policy 1999. Chicago: the
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, at http://www.ccfr.org

A characteristic pattern of episodic public attention to foreign trade issues is well
illustrated by the recent debate over U.S. Congressional approval of the WTO treaty with
China. In the first months of 2000, only 29 percent of Americans claimed to be following
news about the issue either "very" or "somewhat closely." According to Gallup, "the
current level of attention paid to China and the WTO is among the lowest registered
when compared to more than 60 other news events that Gallup has measured since
1991." 10 Yet, a few weeks later, when the issue was closer to a vote by Congress, 41
percent of the public said that they had been following the issue.* A similar pattern was
seen during the NAFTA debates. In both cases, public interest increased as a significant
political action became imminent and attracted more media coverage.
In 1998, newspapers and television were perceived by the public to be the most reliable
source of foreign policy information (Chart 2). Radio was next and the Internet last.
• The public attention given to China's admission to the WTO was similar to that given to the "Who Wants
to be a Millionaire" broadcast three months earlier. Gallup Poll, May 23, 2000.
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Interestingly, an equal percentage (27 percent) of those surveyed felt that either the
Internet was "not reliable" or is a "very reliable" source of foreign policy information. 11

Chart 2
Percent of the Am eric an Public Identifying a Media
as "most reliable" (1998)
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Source: John E. Rielly. American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999. Chicago, IL: the Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations, at http://www.ccfr.org

Foreign Trade and Personal Economic Security
"Pragmatic internationalism," as defined in this analysis, means that the U.S. public tends
to see U.S. foreign policy largely as an instrument to achieve personal economic security.
In 1998, competition from low wage countries was considered a critical threat by 42
percent of the American public, but only 16 percent of the leaders held this view. 12
International terrorism, chemical and biological weapons, and other issues were also
perceived as "critical threats" by the public. In each case, the public expressed
significantly more concern than the leaders, showing an eight percent to 31 percent
difference. 13 The greatest difference centered on "protecting American jobs," with 80
percent of the public giving this a high priority as a U.S. foreign policy goal, compared to
45 percent of the leaders. These public opinion polls findings suggest that the general
public and leaders do not rank foreign policy concerns the same way. In another example
of this dichotomy, a 1994 poll found that, the public ranked international trade (free trade
with other countries and trade relationships) sixth among the top ten issues. The leaders
ranked it first, followed by concerns about the world economy (seventh). 14
Most of the time the foreign policy issues have relatively limited visibility, but specific
events can place them on the public's agenda. In a 1994 poll, respondents were asked to
name a law or bill that Congress had recently passed. Only 5 percent identified NAFT A
(enacted the previous year), compared to 44 percent who identified a crime bill, and 20
percent who mentioned the Brady handgun bill (37 percent could not name any bill). 15
However in a second 1994 poll, the public gave top ranking to economic competition and
immigration as significant threats. The public more widely believed that economic
competition with Japan and risks to American workers were greater domestic threats than
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did leaders (43 percent compared to 33 percent). 16 Economic concerns continued to
increase during the decade, with the public identifying U.S. world trade and the trade
balance as significant issues in 1998. Leaders were even more concerned, placing the
world economy and concerns about the Asian economic crises at the top of their list. 17 A
2000 national poll of registered voters found that 48 percent agreed with the statement
that "foreign trade has been bad for the U.S. economy," compared to 34 percent who
agreed that it had been good for the U.S. economy. 18
The U.S. public is pragmatic about foreign trade, identifying the larger selection of goods
and products imported from other countries as a positive. This view was expressed by 58
percent of the respondents m a 1999 poll. IlTiports were also perceived as helping poorer
families to reduce their cost ofliving (69 percent agreed). The public also agreed that
imports keep American manufacturers on their toes and make them work harder to
improve the quality of their products (73 percent). 19 In a second 1999 national poll, 56
percent of the respondents agreed that foreign trade provides an opportunity for economic
growth through exports, compared to 36 percent who agreed that foreign trade is a threat
because of imports. 20 In general, these polls report themes of economic security and
pragmatism. Respondents support international competition and reaping the benefits of
cheap foreign products at the lowest possible cost to U.S. jobs.
Prior to 1994, many Americans felt that foreign policy had a substantial impact on the
nation's overall economy. This view changed in 1994 for a brief period. The nation was
perceived as less vulnerable to foreign influences, even if personal vulnerability and job
insecurity remained serious concerns. 21 In the mid-1990s, when asked if trade pulls down
wages, two-thirds of American respondents said yes. 22 A 1995 poll found the public
sharply divided by type of employment as to whether jobs being exported to other
countries were a threat to "people like themselves"; 55 percent ofblue-collar and union
members saw a threat compared to 38 percent of executives and professionals.Z 3 One
commentator held that this split could reflect the level of blue-collar unemployment at the
time and fears about job retention. A general restructuring of the market place, resulting
in the loss of many blue-collar jobs, had occurred between the late 1980s and mid1990s.24 As a result of plant closures and layoffs, some workers had to accept jobs at
significantly lower wages. 25 In a poll published in 1996, about the same number of
respondents who agreed that corporate downsizing was bad also agreed that foreign trade
agreements had cost American jobs (59 percent and 54 percent respectively). 26
Public concern about competition with Japan dropped from 62 percent in 1994 to 45
percent in 1998, a period during which the U.S. economy improved but the Japanese
economy floundered. 27 In 1998, the public again agreed that foreign policy affected the
nation's overall economy (63 percent), but only 38 percent agreed that it had a major
impact on their personal standard of living, reversing the opinions in 1994. Still, like the
1994 poll, those individuals most likely to believe that foreign policy had an impact on
their personal style of life were those with less than a college education and yearly
incomes under $25,000? 8 A 1999 poll of Americans who reported a household job loss
found that only 6 percent agreed that the loss resulted from a company moving to Mexico
or another country, or that foreign competition was the reason for the job loss. 29
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Californians were divided in 1996 in their opinions as to whether U.S. trade with other
countries creates more or fewer jobs in the state. About one third agreed that foreign
trade creates more jobs, with more men (41 percent) holding this position than women
(26 percent). In contrast, 40 percent of the respondents felt that foreign trade leads to a
reduction in jobs, with slightly more women (43 percent) than men (38 percent)
agreeing. 30 A different question, asked in 1997, sought to determine Californians'
perceptions about whether foreign trade helps or hurts the economy. Nearly a third of the
respondents felt that trade either helps a lot or somewhat, in contrast to a quarter who felt
that trade hurts the economy. Men were more likely to be positive (38 percent compared
to 27 percent for women), while women were slightly more inclined to be believe that
1]
trade hurts the economy (28 percent compared to 23 percent for men).Globalization
The International Monetary Fund defines globalization as "the growing economic
interdependence of countries worldwide through the increasing volume and variety of
cross-border transactions in goods and services and of international capital flows, and
also through the more rapid and widespread diffusion of technology. "32 A 1998 poll
found that the public agreed that U.S. overall economic strength is more important than
military strength (63 percent); 89 percent ofleaders agreed. In addition, 54 percent of the
public and 87 percent of the leaders felt that increasing connections between the U.S.
economy and the economies of other nations are positive. 33 This level of confidence does
not translate into personal economic security. A recent poll (2000) found that only 43
percent of the public agrees that the global economy will help the average U.S. citizen,
compared to 52 percent who are of the opinion that it will hurt. 34
An individual's level of education and foreign travel experience are positively related to a
supportive view of globalization. For example, in 1998, 58 percent of college graduates
and 68 percent of individuals with post-graduate education favored globalization,
compared to 46 percent of high school graduates. People with international travel
experience were more supportive, 58 percent to 46 percent. Age was not a significant
indicator, as about half the respondents in each age group supported globalization. 35
In a 1998 survey, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations concluded:

Findings that Americans are positive about economic interdependence are
congruent with other established evidence that Americans are relatively
sophisticated about the importance of overseas developments for the U.S.
domestic economy. Among the public, U.S. foreign policy is viewed as having a
major impact on our overall economy (cited by 66%) and on domestic
unemployment (54%), though a relatively small 36% feel the same way about its
influence on their own personal standard of living. 36
Even though polls find that the U.S. public is generally positive about globalization, and
understands the interdependence between the domestic economy, employment and
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overseas developments, poll findings (Chart 3) suggest a rising level of concern. In a
1998 poll about NAFTA and keeping jobs within the U.S., four- fifths of the citizen
respondents ranked protecting American workers as "very important. "37 Leaders, in
contrast, were much more focused on issues involving the world economy in 1998.
Leaders most concerned were concentrated in the business community (25 percent),
compared to 11 percent of labor leaders, and 16 percent of leaders in government or
. 38
academ1a.
A 2001 review of recent public opinion polls indicates that U.S. citizens recognize both
the costs and benefits of integration of the nation's economy with the world economy, but
tend to weigh the costs as being higher than the benefits. 39 Second, the survey data
supports earlier findings that less-skilled workers are much more likely to oppose free
trade than more skilled workers. 4 Finally, this skills-preferences gap may reflect
different wage-growth patterns since the early 1970s. Less skilled workers experienced
close to zero or even negative wage growth relative to higher skilled workers. 41

°

The Seattle World Trade Organization meeting in 1999 focused public attention on
corporate foreign trade practices relating to labor and environmental issues. Frost
summarizes labor and environmental concerns as follows: "As they see it, these
corporations are abandoning workers and communities to pursue profits around the
world. In so doing they are destroying U.S. jobs, undermining health and safety
standards, exploiting foreign workers, and polluting the global environrnent."42 Ricardo
Melendez-Ortiz, at the International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development,
Chart 3
Levels of U.S. Public and Leaders' Concern
About the Global Economy
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Source: John E. Rielly, American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy /999 (Chicago, IL:
the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1999) at http://www.ccfr.org., p. 19.

Geneva, suggests that developing countries, who now make up a majority of the members
of the WTO, are also concerned about the impact of these same issues in their own
countries. 43 There may be some convergence of opinion between the American public's
concerns about jobs and other globalization issues, and various non-government
organizations and developing nations relative to the WTO and other global bodies and
policies.
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International Trade Barriers

Historically, support of trade barriers is tied to protecting American jobs, fairer prices and
other factors. Although a plurality of voters supported trade barriers in 1994 (48
percent), this was the lowest percentage ever recorded in the Chicago Council of Foreign
Relations national survey. 44 Higher income individuals were more inclined than the
general public to support retaining tariffs.
Polls find a trend of general public support for reducing tariffs. 45 In 1997, the public
either strongly or somewhat agreed (79 percent) that reducing trade barriers was an
important way to increase U.S. trade with other countnes ...6 Support for tanffs among
leaders increased from 20 percent in 1994 to 34 percent in 1998. 47 Just six months before
the WTO meeting in Seattle, a majority of Americans (59 percent) agreed that the U.S.
should take the lead in reducing trade barriers. 48

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
In a 1997 survey, the U.S. public was divided about the job-creating potential of
international trade agreements. A significant portion (42 percent) agreed that such
agreements cost jobs. Nearly as many (41 percent) agreed that trade agreements both
create and cost jobs. Only 7 percent agreed that trade only creates jobs. 49 A similar
opinion pattern emerged in an October 2000 poll. About a third (35 percent) of the
Americans surveyed felt that free trade agreements between the U.S. and foreign
countries have helped the U.S. economy, about a third (32 percent) felt they have hurt it,
and 24 percent were of the opinion that trade agreements do not make much difference. 5°
In 1999, three quarters of Americans surveyed felt that human rights abuses, illegal

transfers oftechnology, and allegations of illegal contributions in U.S. political races
should be addressed during the WTO agreement negotiations. Still, less than a majority
agreed about the effectiveness of such efforts. About 48 percent of the respondents felt
that this approach is effective while 40 percent agreed that it does not work.
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

NAFTA was approved by the Senate and signed by the President in 1993. In December
1994, 68 percent ofthe public surveyed were following the issue. 5 1 Three years later, far
fewer were actively interested, with 43 percent saying they had "heard a lot" or "quite a
bit" about the issue, and 57 percent reported "not much" or "little. "52 This 25 percent
drop in public attention could reflect either a decline in news coverage about NAFT A or
a decrease in people's interest.
In 1994, half the public agreed that NAFTA was "mostly good" for the U.S. economy,

compared to about a third who saw it as "mostly bad" (Chart 4). Union households
tended to be more opposed (48 percent) than all working people (40 percent). 53 Leaders
were the most supportive (86 percent). By 1996, the public had become less certain
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about NAFTA, with about halfmoving into the "do not know" category (47 percent). 54
California public support for NAFT A was also evenly divided in a 1996 poll. 55 Two
1997 national polls provided different assessments ofthe public's view ofNAFTA's
economic impact. In response to a broad, more generalized question, the public agreed
that NAFT A was good for the nation. 56 But, when asked more directly about the
economy, they were less certain about how good it was. 57 This same ambivalence
showed up in a 2000 poll, where the public responded that NAFTA did not have a strong
.
.
58
negative Impact.

Chart 4
U.S Public Opinion About NAFTA (1994-2000)
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September 9, 1997; NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll, September 15, 1997; Pew Research Center
Poll, September II, 1997; and Gallup Poll, May 23, 2000.

In 1994, 21 percent of business executives surveyed agreed that NAFTA would help to
reduce costs and to increase demand. 59 A bare majority (52 percent) agreed NAFTA
would help their businesses, compared to 48 percent who thought NAFT A would not
make much of a difference. 60 A large majority (79 percent) of business executives agreed
that non-U.S. companies would establish operations in Mexico to take advantage of
NAFTA. In their view, the largest percentage of such companies would be Japanese (82
percent), followed by Korean (57 percent), Western European (55 percent), and South
American (31 percent). 61
The public was asked in 1994 to compare how well business and unions had handled the
implementation ofNAFTA. Business received a much higher rating (43 percent positive)
than labor (27 percent positive). 62
The public grew more negative over time about the impact ofNAFTA on jobs and wages.
A majority (52 percent) of the public surveyed in a 1994 poll thought that NAFTA would
help the overall job situation. In contrast, 32 percent agreed that it would hurt a lot. 63 In
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1997, a plurality (45 percent) thought that the effect ofNAFTA was to keep wages
6
down ~ and that it would take jobs away (46 percent). 65 About a third agreed that NAFTA
had already cost jobs in their area, and only 9 percent were of the opinion that the treaty
had created jobs. 66
When asked in 1999 what the U.S. should do in regards to the NAFTA treaty, 24 percent
of Americans polled agreed that the U.S. should continue with the treaty, 18 percent
agreed the U.S. should pull out, and 40 percent were ofthe opinion that NAFTA should
be amended. 67

World Trade Organization (WTO) and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)
In 1994, when asked how much they had heard about GATT' s new Uruguay Round to
reduce trade barriers among its members (it had just been signed), about 64 percent of the
public had heard about the agreement, while 36 percent knew little or nothing about it. 68
This level of awareness parallels that for NAFTA suggesting that about a third of the
American public doesn't follow international treaty issues even when an important
decision is made. More people do become interested as political decisions draw closer
and media coverage increases.
In 1995, when Congress was preparing to consider the WTO's proposed role of
administering the GATT treaty, the public was generally unaware of the new trade
organization and its proposed trade rules. 69 Californians had about the same level of
awareness as the national public. When asked how closely they followed the issue in the
news, only about one-third ofboth national and California respondents were aware of the
issue. In both cases, public interest and awareness increased as the issue moved toward a
political decision. When asked if they favored or opposed the treaty, Californians tended
to be more supportive than the public nationally.
In 2000, a national poll found that 62 percent of surveyed Americans agreed that U.S.
participation in the WTO is good for the U.S., compared to 20 percent who believe it is
bad. 70

International Monetary Fund (IMF)
In 1998, only 25 percent of the public felt that the U.S. should contribute more money to
the IMF to address global finance crises, and 51 percent were opposed. In contrast, 82
percent of the leaders polled supported IMF contributions. 71

REGIONAL AND NATIONAL ISSUES
Europe
Public concern about economic competition between the U.S., Japan, and Europe was
high in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 72 In 1994, Americans saw Europe as more
important than Asia to U.S. interests and viewed the European Economic Union
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positively. About one third of the U.S. public believed that European Union trade
practices were unfair, compared to 27 percent of the leaders polled. 73 In 1999, the public
was concerned about how well the government was managing trade disputes with
74
Europe, with 40 percent giving it a top priority.

Chart 5
U.S. Public Opinion about the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
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Mexico
The American public has varied in its perceptions about the importance of Mexico to
U.S. economic interests (Chart 6). The variations seem to follow Mexico's internal
economic and political cycles. Throughout the 1994-1998 period, U.S. leaders appeared
to be less volatile than the public, in that they strongly felt (94-98 percent) that Mexico is
of vital interest to the U.S. 75

Chart6
Public Agreeing that U.S. has a Vital Interest in

Mexico
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Brazil

As with Mexico, American public interest seems to track the internal economic and
domestic fortunes ofBrazil. 76 Following the recent Asian economic crisis (1998), which
also affected Brazil, U.S. leaders, and the public to a much lesser degree, agreed that
Brazil is of vital interest to the U.S. (Chart 7). The leaders interest peaked sharply from
49 percent in 1994 to 75 percent in 1998, after a period of declining interest.
Chart 7
U.S. Leaders and Public pinion Agreement t at
Brazil is of "Vital Interest" to the U.S. (1982-19·98)
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Source: John E. Rielly. American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999. Chicago, IL: the Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations, at http://www.ccfr.org

China

During the Cold War, Americans' attitudes toward China were generally unfavorable. 77
However, they became more positive over time, reaching a favorable 72 percent rating in
a 1989 poll. Following the Tiananmen Square tragedy, there was a large decline to a
favorable rating of only 34 percent in August 1989. Ten years later, a Gallup poll found
this unfavorable attitude continued (38 percent favorable ). 78 Another 1999 poll found
Americans to be about evenly divided over which policy should be given higher priority
with China: advancing economic interests (43 percent) or improving human rights (42
79
percent). The public did not support the loss of American jobs in exchange for
improving human rights in China. 80
In 1999, over half (54 percent) of Americans surveyed favored the just-completed
agreement between China and the U.S. enabling China to join the WTO. This was about
the same proportion of Americans who favored the NAFTA agreement in 1993. In
contrast, around a third of those polled felt the treaty was a bad idea. Many Americans
(60 percent) thought that the treaty would have a major impact on the U.S. economy. 81
Less than half (43 percent) of American conservatives favored the agreement, compared
to 62 percent of liberals and 60 percent of moderates. While 56 percent ofthe survey
respondents agreed that the WTO agreement with China
would help American companies, 59 percent felt that it would hurt American workers
(compared to 35 percent who said it would help workers). Given the choice, respondents
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(61 percent) were more inclined to wait for the Chinese government to make
improvements in political and religious freedoms before entering into the trade
87
agreement. A 2000 poll found that 57 percent of Americans agreed that trade between the U.S. and
China would mostly hurt American workers, while 28 percent said it would mostly
help. 83 Slightly more of the respondents were inclined to believe that increased trade with
China would benefit our economy than would hurt (48 percent to 3 7 percent). Younger
Americans were more optimistic, with 59 percent of those surveyed between the ages of
18 and 29 believing that the I IS economy would benefit A third ofthis younger group

felt that trade would also help U.S. workers. Americans with higher incomes or levels of
education were most likely to agree (87 percent) that increased trade would mostly help
the Chinese economy. Almost half of Americans agreed that increased trade would help
human rights in China, while 18 percent had no opinion. 84

National Foreign Trade Goals
Most Americans favor an active role for the U.S. in world affairs (65 percent). This is
particularly true for leaders (almost 100 percent). Both figures, reported for 1994, have
remained relatively unchanged since World War II. 85 Nonetheless, the importance of
foreign policy on the national agenda has declined. Not a single foreign policy issue
appeared on the public's top ten list of national issues. This was even true of leaders.
Domestic issues, particularly the recession and crime led both lists. 86
In 1996, 57 percent of Californians felt that it was important for presidential candidates to
have the "right position" on foreign trade. This was particularly important to
87
Republicans. A hint as to what that position might be is revealed in a 1997 poll. In
1997, the American public was asked what role government should take to ensure that
workers and businesses benefit from international trade. Forty percent of survey
respondents agreed that government should not protect businesses or workers but should
help both to compete; 37 percent felt that the government should protect workers; and 17
percent agreed that government should not be involved in the issue at all. 88

California Research Bureau, California State Library

13

Notes
1

John E. Rielly, American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999 (Chicago: the Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR), 1999). Posted at http://www.ccfr.org.
2

Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1995,
American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1995. Summary posted at
http://\\'v.rw.ccfr.org/publications/opinion/findings.html.
3

Hart and Teeter Research Companies, April29-May 1, 2000, and Association of Women in
International Trade, May 1999. Note: the author has archived copies of poll questions cited in the
study and ate available for rev1ew.
4

Rielly, American Public Opinion . .. 1999.

5

Ibid.

6

Association of Women in International Trade, May 1999.

7

Rielly, American Public Opinion . .. 1999.

8

Ibid.

9

Ibid.

10

Gallup Poll, May 17, 2000.

11

Rielly, American Public Opinion ... 1999.

12

Ibid.

13

Ibid.

14

Chicago Council of Foreign Relations. "American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy
199 5." http://www .ccfr.org/publications/opinion/findings.html

15

Harris Poll, January 31, 1994.

16

CCFR, American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1995.

17

Rielly, American Public Opinion. . 1999.

18

Hart and Teeter Research Companies Poll, April29-May 1, 2000.

19

Association ofWomen in International Trade Poll, May 1999.

20

Gallup Organization Poll, May 18-May 21, 2000.

21

CCFR, American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1995.

22

Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone too Far? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International
Economics, 1997), 90-92.
23

Roper Organization Poll, May, 1994.

24

Ellen Frost, "Gaining Support for Trade from the American Public," in Geza Feketekuty and
Bruce Stokes, eds., Trade Strategies for a New Era. (Monterey: Monterey Institute of
International Studies, 1998), 65-82.
25

Ibid.

California Research Bureau, California State Library

14

26

Washington Post Poll, October 15, 1996.

27

Rielly, American Public Opinion ... 1999.

28

CCFR, American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1995.

29

Association ofWomen in International Trade Poll, May 1999.

30

Los Angeles Times Poll, March 17, 1996.

31

Los Angeles Times Poll, September 9, 1997.

32

Marvin Zonis, "Digitizing Globalization," WoldT ink, July-August 2000

33

Rielly, American Public Opinion ... 1999.

34

Rob Norton, "Anti-Trade/Pro-Poverty," Fortune, Jan 10, (2000), 40.

35

Rielly, American Public Opinion ... 1999.

36

Ibid.

37

Ibid.

38

Ibid.

39

Kenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter, Globalization and the Perceptions ofAmerican
Workers (Washingtn, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2001).

40

NBC News-Wall Street Journal Poll, April 4, 2001.

41

Scheve, Globalization and. .. .2001.

42

Ellen Frost, "Gaining Support," 65-82.

43

Remarks by Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz, International Center for Trade and Sustainable
Development, Geneva, at the California Council for International Trade conference, "Trade
Policy for the 21st Century: Strategies for Sustainable Global Commerce," January 10-12, 2001,
Monterey, California.
44

CCFR, American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1995.

45

Rielly, American Public Opinion ... 1999.

46

Democratic Leadership Council Poll, July 27, 1997.

47

Rielly, American Public Opinion . .. 1999.

48

Association ofWomen in International Trade Poll, May 1999.

49

Time/CNN Poll, April 18, 1997.

·o
~ NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll, October 1999.
~

'1

Gallup Poll, December 1, 1994.

52

General Social Surveys Poll, 1996.

53

Harris Poll, January 31, 1994.

54

General Social Surveys Poll, 1996.

55

Los Angeles Times Poll, September 9, 1997.

California Research Bureau, California State Library

15

-6

) NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll, September 15, 1997.
57

Pew Research Center Poll, September 11, 1997.

-s

) Gallup Poll, May 23, 2000.
59

KPMG Peat Marwick Poll, December 1994.

60

Gallup Poll, December 1994.

61

KPMG Peat Marwick Poll, December 1994.

62

Rielly, American Public Opiniou

63

Ibid.

64

Wisconsin Pubic Television Poll, July 15, 1997.

65

Pew Research Center Poll, November 21, 1997.

66

67
68
69
70

1999

NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll, October 27, 1997.
Association of Women in International Trade Poll, May 1999.
United State Information Agency Poll, April, 1994.
Americans Talk Issues Poll, 1995.
Princeton Survey Research Association Poll, April24-May 4, 2000.

71

Rielly, American Public Opinion ... 1999.

72

Ibid.

73

74
75

CCFR, American Public Opinion and US. Foreign Policy 1995.
Pew Research Center Poll, April 8, 1999.
Rielly, American Public Opinion ... 1999.

76

Ibid.

77

Gallup Poll, June 3, 1999.

78

Ibid.

79

Princeton Survey Research Group Poll, April24-May 4, 2000.

80

Ibid.

81

Hart-Teeter Poll, April 1999.

82

Gallup Poll, November 30, 1999.

83

Gallup Organization Poll, May 5-May 7, 2000.

84

Gallup Poll, May 17, 2000.

85

86

87
88

CCFR, American Public Opinion and US. Foreign Policy 1995.
Ibid.
California Poll, Field Institute, Sept. 11, 1996.
Democratic Leadership Council Poll, July 27, 1997.

California Research Bureau, California State Library

16

